Club Stanyon Street, A Utah Non-Profit Membership Corporation v. Utah Liquor Control Commission : Brief of Respondent In Support of Respondent\u27s Petition For Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
Club Stanyon Street, A Utah Non-Profit
Membership Corporation v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission : Brief of Respondent In Support of
Respondent's Petition For Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.G. Blaine Davis; Attorney forPetitionerRobert B. Hansen, John
S. McAllister; Attorney for Respondent
This Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Rehearing, Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, No. 16384 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1693
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF U'l'AH 
-----------------------------------------
CLUB STANYON STREET, a Utah 
non-profit membership 
corporation, 
Petitioner, 
-v-
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
.a. Blaine Davis 
.ioaGAN, SCALLEY & PAVI. 
IU East Third So11th 
tecond Floor 
·lalt Lake City, Utah 84111 
. Attorneys fox- Petitioner·· 
' ~ ' 
Cqe· 111o. 
.. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLUB STANYON STREET, a Utah 
non-profit membership 
corporation, 
Pe ti ti oner, 
-v-
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 16384 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-------------------~---------------------
G. Blaine Davis 
MORGAN, SCALLEY & DAVIS 
261 East Third South 
Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
State of Utah 
JOHN S. McALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE ----------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT --------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADIVSE 
RESPONDENT THAT THE HEARING 
WOULD GO FORWARD WITH ORAL 
ARGUMENT UNDULY PREJUDICED 
RESPONDENT'S CASE. ------------- 4 
POINT II THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER AND DEMON-
STRATES ADEQUATE PROOF OF 
ALCOHOLIC CONTENTS OF THE 
DRINKS. ------------------------ 6 
POINT III THE COURT MUST UPHOLD THE COM-
MISSION'S ORDER UNLESS THE ORDER 
IS CLEARLY ARBITRARY AND 
CAPRICIOUS. -------------------- 10 
SUMMARY -------------------------------------- 12 
-i-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Authorities Cited 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Section 32-l-32.2(d) 
Section 32-l-32.2(f) 
Section 32-1-32.6 
Cases Cited 
Club Stanxon Street v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, No. 16384, filed June 16, 
1980. ----------------------------------
DeFusion Companr v. Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, No. 16368, filed June 10, 
1980. ----------------------------------
Pride Club v. Hulbert, 509 P.2d 819 (1973) ---
-ii-
11 
11 
9,12 
7,10 
2,5,7 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
CLUB STANYON STREET, a Utah 
non-profit membership 
corporation, 
Petitioner, Case No. 16384 
-v-
UTAH LIQUOR CONTROL 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Petitioner in this matter, a private liquor club, 
asked the Supreme Court to review a Utah Liquor Control 
Commission Order suspending the club's liquor license for 
one week. After a hearing on June 18, 1980, before the 
Supreme Court, this court vacated the Commission's Order, 
as contained in its opinion, No. 16384, filed July 16, 1980, 
(corrected copy.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent Utah Liquor Control Commission seeks 
a rehearing of this matter before the Utah Supreme Court. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This matter was set before the Court on June 
18, 1980. On June 9, 1980, counsel for petitioner 
requested oral argument. Counsel also requested and 
received from respondent a stipulation to continue the 
hearing from June 18, 1980, to sometime after June 23, 
1980, because counsel for petitioner would be out of 
the state and not available to argue the case, but did 
desire to have oral argument on this matter. 
Without further notice of any kind to respondent, 
the petitioner club was represented in oral argument before 
the Court on June 18, 19 8 0 , and in that argument, petitioner ! 
presented for the Court's consideration an issue not 
addressed in petitioner's brief on appeal which was 
supported with new authority not cited in its brief. 
The main issue raised in petitioner's argument 
before the Court on June 18, 1980, was the content of 
alcohol or proof of liquor in the drinks served to the 
law enforcement agent. In addition, the main authority 
relied on in petitioner's argument was the recent case 
of DeFusion Company v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
No. 16368, filed June 10, 1980. In the opinion of this 
Court, No. 16384, dated July 16, 1980, (corrected copy) 
it is clear that this Court considered the new issue and 
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new authority as controlling in the matter before the 
Court: 
The situation here is similar to that 
in a recent case of DeFusion Company 
v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
No. 16368, filed June 10, 1980. 
Sparing repetition we refer to that 
decision as applicable here. 
Without notice of any kind, counsel for re-
spondent Commission was unable to present any oral argu-
ment whatsoever on the issues raised in the brief, and 
was unable to meet the issue on the alcohol content of 
the drink addressed for the first time in oral argument. 
Further, counsel was surprised by new authority relied 
on by counsel for petitioner without any chance to have 
the Court consider the respondent's views on the case. 
As a result of counsel for petitioner neglecting 
to advise that petitioner would be represented on June 18, 
1980, that he intended to address an additional issue not 
addressed in petitioner's brief, and that he further in-
tended to rely on additional new authority not cited in 
the brief, petitioner was given undue advantage and re-
spondent has been unduly prejudiced by a surprise and by 
the inability to have this Court consider any argument 
contrary to petitioner's case. 
Respondent now respectfully asks this Court to 
grant a rehearing to consider respondent's case and to 
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allow its response to the issue and authority raised for 
the first time at oral argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADVISE RESPONDENT 
THAT THE HEARING WOULD GO FORWARD WITH 
ORAL ARGUMENT UNDULY PREJUDICED RESPONDENT'S 
CASE. 
Respondent was entitled to rely on petitioner's 
counsel's representations that he would be out of the state 
and unavailable for oral argument and that the hearing would 
probably be continued. While it is realized that the 
stipulation is not binding on the court, the practice is 
to grant a continuance where there is a legitimate reason 
and an agreement by counsel for that continuance. Thus, 
where no continuance was granted, petitioner's counsel 
should have informed respondent that the hearing would go 
forward with oral argument in addition to the briefs which 
had been submitted. 
At oral argument on June 18, 1980, petitioner's 
club was represented by counsel. While petitioner's counse:I 
I 
in fact made arrangements for representation of petitioner 
before the court, he neglected to give notice that the matte~ 
I 
would be heard before the court thus resulting in the absen~ 
of respondent's counsel. 
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During the oral argument petitioner through 
its counsel raised the issue of the alcoholic content 
of the drinks and argued that there was not sufficient 
basis for the Commission's finding of alcohol content. 
The issue of alcoholic content in the drinks was not 
raised or addressed in petitioner's brief and therefore 
arose for the first time as a new issue in oral argument. 
Respondent has thus been surprised and prejudiced without 
opportunity to respond to the issue of proof of alcoholic 
content of the drinks. 
In addition, in support of its argument on the 
alcoholic content, petitioner relied on the recent case 
of DeFusion Company v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
No. 16368, filed June 10, 1980. The case was not cited 
in petitioner's brief and no notice was ever given to 
respondent that petitioner club intended to rely on the 
case. Yet it is clear that petitioner relied on that 
particular case to support its argument on alcoholic 
content of the drinks and that the court considered 
the DeFusion case controlling. "Sparing repetition we 
refer to that decision as applicable here." Thus, it 
is clear that the respondent has been surprised and pre-
judiced by the introduction of a new case and authority 
with no opportunity to distinguish or explain that case 
to the court. 
-5-
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The Supreme Court has invariably refused to 
consider matters raised for the first time on appeal. 
In this case not only was the matter and authority raised 
for the first time on appeal, but it was raised only at 
oral argument, in respondent's absence and without notice. 
Surely due process of law allows respondent some opportunity 
to address the issue and respond to the arguments which 
are advanced by the petitioner. It is difficult to make 
a fully considered decision on only one side of the issue, 
and respondent should be allowed to have its side of the 
issue heard. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE COM-
MISSION'S ORDER AND DEMONSTRATES ADEQUATE 
PROOF OF ALCOHOLIC CONTENTS OF THE DRINKS. 
Even though the issue and authority were raised 
only at oral argument and not in petitioner's brief, it is 
clear that the court's opinion centers around proof of 
alcoholic content of the drinks sold to the enforcement 
agent: 
Without any proper foundation or 
proof as to their alcoholic content, 
the samples of drinks which he had 
taken were received as evidence. 
* * * 
-6-
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The situation here is similar to 
that in our recent case of DeFusion 
Company v. Utah Liquor Control Com-
mission filed June 10, 1980. Sparing 
repetition we refer to that decision 
as applicable here. 
It is our conclusion that the record 
does not justify the order of the 
Commission suspending the plaintiff's 
license. It is therefore vacated. 
Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission, filed June 16, 
1980. No. 16384. 
In the foregoing DeFusion Company case the 
clear question was whether there was" ... a purchase 
from the state liquor store at the club of an alcoholic 
beverage." In other words, there must be evidence that 
a "drink is an alcoholic beverage as defined in the act." 
In effect the DeFusion Company case requires more evidence 
than simply a name alone. In our case, (Stanyon Street) 
the court's opinion concludes that "the record does not 
justify the order of the Commission suspending the 
plaintiff's license." 
Respondent submits that the Court erred and that 
there is in fact adequate proof of support of the Commission's 
decision. The testimony, as revealed in the record, was 
that at least on two occasions the enforcement agent ordered 
an alcoholic beverage by the name of "vodka collins." He 
was served that drink and he paid the price for that drink. 
-7-
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(Transcript of Hearing pp. 23-24.) In addition, the 
officer testified that the samples had been analyzed 
and the reports relating to that analysis were sub-
mitted and received by the hearing officer. There 
never were any samples offered or received into 
evidence. In the context of ordering and paying for 
and drinking a "vodka collins" from a state store in 
a licensed private club the facts clearly support the 
Commission's finding and order. The Commission is not 
held to a standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt" in 
a hearing to determine whether to suspend or remove 
a state store, and the evidence, uncontroverted, is 
sufficient. 
On the evidence, the Commission found as follows: 
5. Narcotic and liquor law enforce-
ment agent William Lang utilized the 
facilities of the Club Stanyon Street, 
and ordered a vodka/collins and paid 
$1.50. Even without the evidence, the 
fact that the agent ordered an alcoholic 
beverage and the licensee charged the 
agent for an alcoholic beverage con-
vinces the Commission that the beverage 
contained alcohol. 
6. Sample of the alcoholic beverage 
purchased November 14, 1978, was obtained. 
7. Utah State Division of Health toxi-
cology service report is attached and 
was presented as evidence. Said report 
states that the sample contained alcohol. 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8. Narcotic and liquor law enforce-
ment agent William Lang utilized the 
facilities of Club Stanyon Street and 
purchased alcohol from the state store 
within said organization on November 22 
1978. ' 
* * * 
10. A sample of the drink purchased 
November 22, 1978, was obtained. 
Toxicology report indicated drink 
contained alcohol. 
The law is clear that findings of facts by 
the Commission are conclusive and binding in a review of 
the matter by the Supreme Court: 
The findings and conclusions of the 
Commission on questions on fact shall 
be final and shall not be subject to 
review. Section 32-1-32.6, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
If the court has determined that the action by 
the Commission is arbitrary or capricious then the court 
should say so in its opinion. If the action is not 
arbitrary or capricious then the court should uphold 
the Commission's decision. Moreover, the Commission 
in finding No. 8 found facts showing a violation of the 
Commission's regulations, but the opinion is silent on 
this point. 
In summary of Point I, the Court erred in two 
important ways regarding the Commission's order. First, 
the Court disregarded the law requiring the court to 
-9-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
recognize the Cornrnission's findings of facts as con-
elusive. Second, the court erred when it cited a lack 
of foundation for samples which were never offered or 
received and are not at issue. Respondent submits that 
the order of the Cornrnission is not arbitary or capricious 
and should be upheld. 
POINT III 
THE COURT MUST UPHOLD THE COMMISSION'S 
ORDER UNLESS THE ORDER IS CLEARLY 
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS. 
The law in Utah is clear that this Court will 
uphold an order of the Liquor Control Commission unless 
it is arbitrary or capricious or beyond authority of the 
Cornrnission. Pride Club v. Hulbert, 509 P.2d 819(1973). 
In the Stanyon Street case the court's opinion continues: 
The Commission as an administrative 
body may be justified in taking the 
position that it is not necessarily 
bound to adhere to the technical rules 
of evidence and procedure as applied 
in the courts. Nevetheless, wherein 
it is performing a duty of a judicial 
nature in which the findings of fact 
and the adjudication of important 
rights is involved, care should be taken 
that the procedures should comport with 
the procedures of fairness and due process. 
Club Stanyon Street v. Utah Liquor Control 
Cornrnission, No. 16384, filed July 16, 1980. 
It must be pointed out that it is not the commissi:~ 
which "takes a position that the rules of evidence need no: 
-10-
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be adhered to" rather the authority and responsibility 
is given directly to the Commission by the Legislature 
to adopt rules of practice and procedure for hearings 
wherein "technical rules of evidence need not be applied 
in the conduct of such hearings before the Commission •••• " 
Section 32-l-32.2(d), Utah Code Annotated. Thus, not 
adhering to the technical rules should not be cause for 
vacating the order of the Commission. 
Moreover, the court refers to "adjudication 
of important rights" in this case. But -che legislature 
has clearly spoken its intent regarding state outlets 
for the sale of liquor. A state store is defined as 
an outlet for the sale or lease of liquor located on 
premises owned or leased by the State of Utah. Section 
32-1-3, Utah Code Annotated. Further, 
no vendor or any other person shall 
be deemed to have a pecuniary interest 
in the establishment of or the continua-
tion of any state store in any restaurant, 
social club or association licensed under 
the provision of Chapter 6, Title 16. 
Section 32-l-32.2(f), Utah Code Annotated. 
Thus, the petitioner does not have an "important 
right" to a state store, and if the Commission then decides 
to suspend the state store, as was done in this case: 
no appeal may be taken, writ issued or 
any review proceeding undertaken by the 
Supreme Court or any other court of any 
-11-
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action taken by the Commission to 
suspend or remove a state store from 
the premises of any restaurant, social 
club or association licensed under the 
provisions of Chapter 6, Title 16. 
Section 32-1-32.6, Utah Code Annotated. 
Thus, the Legislature has determined that the 
Commission has sole right and authority to control outlets 
for the sale of liquor, and there is no right or authority 
which vests in a club simply because they are granted a 
privilege of operating a state store on their premises. 
The law is clear in this regard. The law is presumed 
to be correct, it has not been challenged, and it should 
be followed. 
In the event that an act of the Commission should 
be found to be arbitrary or capricious, or beyond its 
authority, the court might be justified in reversing that 
act or vacating the order of the Commission. However, in 
that event, the court's opinion should clearly state the 
reasons why it finds the acts to be arbitrary or capricious. 
No such finding appears in this case. 
SUMMARY 
Respondent Commission has been prejudiced with-
out any opportunity to argue its side of this matter to 
the Court. Moreover, respondent has been surprised to 
its detriment by the petitioners relying on a new issue 
and new authority not addressed in its brief. Without 
-12-
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any opportunity to argue or respond to that issue and 
authority, respondent is precluded from the protection 
of due process and fairness of law. 
Moreover, the opinion of July 16, 1980, 
(corrected copy) indicates that there is not adequate 
support in the record for the Cormnission's decision. 
It is submitted that in point of fact there is adequate 
support in the record and that the findings of the Com-
mission regarding those facts are conclusive and must 
be recognized by the Court. 
Further, the Commission by law has exclusive 
authority to determine the operation of its own state 
stores. A private club gains no rights or interests in 
a state store and the law admits no review of a decision 
to suspend liquor sales through a state store. 
Thus, in fairness to the respondent there should 
be an opportunity provided to hear and consider its side 
of the case and to correct the deficiencies in the opinion 
of July 16, 1980. Respondent therefore respectfully requests 
that this court grant a rehearing of the matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
JOHN S. McALLISTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies 
of the foregoing brief, postage prepaid, to: 
G. Blaine Davis, Attorney for Petitioner, 261 East Third 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, on this the 5th _day 
of August, 1980. 
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